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PYRRHIC VICTORY: TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING, “BUT FOR,” AND DEVELOPER 
CAPTURE IN THE DALLAS ARENA 
DISTRICT 
 
ROBERT SROKA* 
“When there’s no basketball or hockey, it can seem like a ghost town.  
One broker says you can scream, and no one will hear you.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Typically understood in the infrastructure finance context, public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) are a conceptual catch-all for structures where the risk and 
benefit of a public project is shared with a private-sector partner.2  One  
particularly well-trodden variety of PPP in the United States is tax increment 
financing (TIF), which has been used at some point by every state, except  
Arizona,3 and has become increasingly common in the professional sports  
facility context.  TIF is a form of local economic development partnership, 
historically intended to alleviate blight and to spur urban redevelopment that 
“but-for” the TIF subsidy would not have happened as quickly.  From these 
roots, TIF has expanded to being a one-stop development solution, due in 
large part to its saleability as self-financing.  
This Article broadly evaluates the Dallas Sports Arena TIF District 
(SATD), which was created to reimburse public improvements surrounding 
the American Airlines Center (AAC), as well as the Victory Park real estate 
development that has been constructed within the SATD since the arena’s 
2001 opening.  Specifically, the SATD is viewed through two common TIF 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Robert Sroka is a PhD student and LLM Candidate at the University of Michigan.  He holds a 
JD from the University of British Columbia and is called in British Columbia and Alberta.  His  
practice focuses on local government law. 
1. Mitchell Schnurman, Why Victory Park Was a Bust, D MAG, Jan.–Feb. 2010, 
https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-ceo/2010/january-february/why-victory-park-was-a-bust/.  
2. See EMANUEL S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2d ed. 2000).  
3. Kenneth A. Kriz, The Use of Tax Increment Financing in Nebraska, PLATTE INST., POL’Y 
STUDY, 2 (Jul. 2013), https://www.platteinstitute.org/Library/docLib/20130710_my_Platte-TIF.pdf.  
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criticisms that the literature has identified as especially valid: that many TIF 
projects lack a legitimate “but-for” element and that sub-optimal transparency 
allows projects to escape sufficient scrutiny.  
After a conceptual overview of TIF, TIF in Texas, and local Dallas TIF 
policy, the SATD story is set out prior to an analysis of results through these 
two critical lenses. This Article argues that the weak legal standard of  
“but-for” in Texas has allowed TIF to subsidize SATD projects that would 
have gone ahead in much the same way absent TIF.  Further, the transparency 
issue has manifested itself in a form of regulatory capture where the developer 
parties have garnered the spoils at the cost of the greater polity through timely 
leveraging of bargaining power, contractual structure, and alignment of  
interests with the local economic development agency.  Ironically, the built-in 
failure of the framework emerging from this developer capture has provided 
the SATD its most legitimate claim to “but-for” in resolving a completely 
manufactured brake on development and area success. 
II. TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
A. An Overview of TIF 
At its most basic, TIF involves designating a geographic area within a  
jurisdiction where a revenue baseline is established.4  Revenue below the  
baseline will continue to flow as before, but new “incremental” revenues are 
retained and spent within the geographic zone.5  TIF districts are usually term 
limited by statute and after a district sunsets, revenues will revert to the  
general fund.6  Common targets for captured increment include streetscape and 
public realm improvements, as well as infrastructure and site preparation.7 
As incremental revenue will often take years to materialize, many TIF  
projects will borrow against anticipated revenues to speed up the  
redevelopment process.  For those jurisdictions either adverse to or statutorily 
barred from issuing TIF-backed debt, a pay-as-you-go approach will be taken 
where TIF funds are allocated to reimburse up-front developer investments.8  
The benefit to the developer-financed variant of this second form is that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy 
of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 66, 67 (2010). 
5. Id. 
6. Nicholas Greifer, An Elected Official’s Guide to Tax Increment Financing, GOVERNMENT 
FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, 18 (2005), 
http://www.gfoa.org/sites/default/files/EOGTIF.pdf. 
7. Id. at 9. 
8. Id. at 33. 
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impact is received in the early life of the TIF zone, and is ostensibly useful in 
the pursuit of further investment within the zone, while the risk of  
underperformance is shifted to the private developer.9  This  
developer-financed pay-as-you-go form of TIF spending is used in the Dallas 
SATD.  As we will later see, the benefits of this model are complicated by the 
“but-for” issue—if a developer can finance the TIF improvements out of 
pocket, why is TIF necessary?  
The sprawling TIF literature has been well subcategorized by Greenbaum 
and Landers under three headings respectively focused on property valuation, 
economic development, and fiscal outcomes.10  With property valuation and 
economic development, the literature is mixed. Anderson,11 Man and  
Rosentraub,12 Smith,13 and Carroll14 all indicate a positive relationship  
between TIF use and property valuation, although a similarly persuasive roster 
of works argue that TIF has had limited or more mixed results.15  Likewise, 
there is contrary evidence on whether TIF-using cities grow more quickly.16  
The fiscal literature highlights the threat of TIF being more effective in  
capturing revenue from overlapping jurisdictions (such as school boards) than 
creating new increment,17 the dividing a city into “haves and have-nots,”18 as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9. Id. 
10. See Robert T. Greenbaum & Jim Landers, The Tiff Over TIF: A Review of the Literature Ex-
amining the Effectiveness of the Tax Increment Financing, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 655 (2014).  
11. See John E. Anderson, Tax Increment Financing: Municipal Adoption and Growth, 43 NAT’L 
TAX J. 155 (1990). 
12. See Joyce Y. Man & Mark S. Rosentraub, Tax Increment Financing: Municipal Adoption and 
Effects on Property Value Growth, 26 PUB. FIN. REV. 523 (1998). 
13. See Brent C. Smith, The Impact of Tax Increment Finance Districts on Localized Real Estate: 
Evidence from Chicago’s Multifamily Markets, 15 J HOUSING ECON. 21 (2006). 
14. See Deborah A. Carroll, Tax Increment Financing and Property Value: An Examination of 
Business Property Using Panel Data, 43 URB. AFF. REV. 520 (2004). 
15. E.g., Kevin Kane & Rachel Weber, Municipal Investment and Property Value Appreciation in 
Chicago’s Tax Increment Financing Districts, 36 J PLAN. EDUC. RES. 167 (2016); David F. Merriman 
et al., Do Tax Increment Finance Districts Stimulate Growth in Real Estate Values?, 39 REAL EST. 
ECON. 221, (2011); Rachel Weber et al., Does Tax Increment Financing Raise Urban Industrial 
Property Values?, 40 URB. STUD. 2001 (2003). 
16. E.g., Anderson, supra note 11; Man & Rosentraub, supra note 12; Joyce Y. Man, The Impact 
of Tax Increment Financing Programs on Local Economic Development, 11 J PUB. BUDGETING 417 
(1999); cf. Paul Byrne, Does Tax Increment Financing Deliver on Its Promise of Jobs? The Impact of 
Tax Increment Financing on Municipal Employment Growth, 20 ECON DEV. Q. 1 (2009); Richard 
Dye & David Merriman, The Effects of Tax Increment Financing on Economic Development, 47 J 
URB. ECON. 306 (2000); T. William Lester, Does Chicago’s Tax Increment Financing (TIF) Program 
Pass the ‘But-for’ Test? Job Creation and Economic Development Impacts Using Time-series Data, 
51 URB. STUD. 655 (2014). 
17. See Jack R. Huddleston, Local Financial Dimensions of Tax Increment Financing: A Cost-­‐
Revenue Analysis, 2 PUB. BUDGETING AND FIN. 40 (1982); Kenneth Kriz, The Effect of Tax Incre-
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well as a tendency to over credit assessment gains to TIF.19 
Beyond the categories of Greenbaum and Landers, this Article specifically 
builds upon the work that has covered the issue of TIF disproportionately  
serving the interests of private developers.20  This avenue is an extension of 
the theory on regulatory capture (itself a branch of public choice theory) which 
outlines that private interests can become the dominant objective of public 
regulatory agencies due to the cost-benefit imbalance between prospective 
capturing actors (with high potential gains) and the general public (with a  
relatively minimal and diffused stake in outcomes).21  As later explained, in 
combination with basic bargaining theory, the use of TIF in the SATD can be 
fairly well understood through this aspect of the literature and its theoretical 
parents.  
B. TIF Statute in Texas 
Chapter 311 of the Texas Tax Code governs TIF in Texas.22  Both  
municipalities and counties can create TIF zones, initiated through either  
private petition or local government discretion.23  While focused on property 
tax increment, the sales-tax increment may also be included in a TIF zone  
pursuant to section 311.0123.24  The two core traditional components of TIF, 
“but-for” and “blight,” are respectively addressed by sections 311.003 through 
311.005.25  The former describes that a “reinvestment zone” requires local 
government determination “that development or redevelopment would not  
occur solely through private investment in the reasonably foreseeable future” 
and that an ordinance creating a “reinvestment zone” must clearly describe the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ment Finance on Local Government Financial Condition, 22 MUN. FIN. J 41 (2001); David B. Law-
rence & Susan C. Stevenson, The Economics and Politics of Tax Increment Financing, 26 GROWTH 
AND CHANGE 105 (1995); Gary Sands et al., Tips for TIFs: Policies for Neighborhood Tax Increment 
Financing Districts, 38 COMMUNITY DEV. 68 (2008).  
18. See generally Alison Felix & James Hines, Who Offers Tax-Based Business Development In-
centives?, 75 J. URB. ECON. 80 (2013). 
19. Greenbaum & Landers, supra note 10, at 660. 
20. E.g., Briffault, supra note 4; George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Ameri-
cans: The Uses and Abuses of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAW. 427 (2011).  
21. See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A The-
ory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089 (1991); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, 
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 167 (1990). 
22. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 311 (2017). 
23. § 311.005. 
24. § 311.0123.  
25. § 311.003–005. 
SROKA	  28.1	  FINAL.DOCX	  (DO	  NOT	  DELETE)	   12/20/17	  	  1:05	  PM	  
2017] TIF IN THE DALLAS ARENA DISTRICT  205 
geographical boundaries, create a board of directors, as well as outline  
effective and termination dates for the zone.26   
Section 311.005 then provides a number of avenues for a finding of 
“blight.”  At its most basic, only one of the blight sub-conditions needs to be 
made out in addition to the general “blight” chapeau.27  Combined with the 
lack of further definition or detailed quantitative thresholds, the requirements 
are not difficult to meet and are evaluated in the subjective opinion of the  
jurisdiction.28  Yet there are additional paths, including a petition by property 
owners accounting for over fifty percent of assessed values in a proposed  
district, and for being a primarily open or undeveloped area substantially  
“impairing” the jurisdiction’s growth.29  This latter provision means that a 
greenspace site can be designated a TIF area, which the literature has viewed 
as being less than best practices,30 and makes the test more one of  
underdevelopment than strictly blight.  Finally, a reinvestment zone can be 
designated simply because an existing or proposed mass transit rail system 
passes through, which further simplifies the process for transit-oriented  
development.31 
Section 311.006 places some restrictions on the composition of a TIF 
zone, the most notable being a cap for TIF at twenty-five percent of a  
jurisdiction’s assessed value.32  This precludes a Chicago-like situation, where 
over thirty percent of the city was inside of a TIF district as of 2014.33  Section 
311.015 explicitly limits TIF bond repayment to funds from the TIF zone that 
the debt was incurred for, meaning that there is no claim against general  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26. § 311.003. 
27. § 311.005. The chapeau reads:  
 
substantially arrest or impair the sound growth of the municipality or county 
designating the zone, retard the provision of housing accommodations, or  
constitute an economic or social liability and be a menace to the public health, 
safety, morals, or welfare in its present condition and use because of the pres-
ence of . . .   
 
28. Id.  
29. Id.  
30. See Kathleen Knavel, Wisconsin’s Tax Increment Finance Law: How Wisconsin’s Cities  
Subsidize Sprawl, 8 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 115 (2002); Briffault, supra note 4, at 91. 
31. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 311.005. 
32. § 311.006.  
33. Meredith Wilson, In a TIF: Chicagoans Angry About Obscure Funding Method, MEDILL REP. 
CHI., Mar. 18, 2015, http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/in-a-tif-chicagoans-angry-about-
obscure-funding-method/. 
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revenues of the issuing jurisdiction.34  Effectively limiting the debt pool to the 
TIF area reduces local government risk, but makes the debt a riskier  
proposition for investors.35  In turn, interest rates will be higher and the project 
becomes more costly to the local government in the long-term.36  
The Texas TIF law may however be more notable for the restrictions not 
present.  First, there is no time limit for a TIF district,37 allowing a jurisdiction 
to reinvest increment within the TIF zone indefinitely, which is important  
because the eventual reversion to general revenues is a commonly cited benefit 
to TIF.  Also absent is a sufficient limit on the “but-for” test.  While there is 
indeed a “but-for” requirement, it can be solely and subjectively determined 
by the local authority, meaning that there is little objective limit.  The obvious 
issue is that TIF may merely be capturing the increment that was likely, or 
even certain to occur, in any event as opposed to spurring new investment.38  
Similarly, the Texas statute lacks quantitative means for evaluating the  
presence of the blight pre-requisites that are present, allowing local  
interpretation whims and preferences to prevail in both traditional core  
components of a TIF use test. 
Still, Texas does incorporate some less explicit TIF brakes.  First, as TIF 
does not capture state revenues, the intent of the legislature may have simply 
been to provide local governments leeway to use TIF within the twenty-five 
percent cap as a percentage of assessed value, trusting that local governments 
would have the incentive to develop best practices from collective experience.  
Likewise, participation in a TIF zone by overlaying jurisdictions such as 
school districts and counties is negotiated, meaning that it is up to the TIF  
proposing jurisdiction to sell the benefits of capture to an inherently skeptical 
audience.  Without overlaying capture, TIF has been seen as less attractive  
relative to other economic development schemes,39 meaning that counties and 
school districts can act as a further check beyond the assessed value share cap.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 311.015 (one slight wrinkle to this is that municipalities can by 
contract with debt holders also place revenue from municipal owned facilities in the TIF plan into the 
pool of funds for repayment). 
35. See generally A. James Heins, The Interest Rate Differential Between Revenue Bonds and 
General Obligations: A Regression Model, 15 NAT’L TAX J. 399 (1962).  
36. Id. at 405. 
37. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 311 (although TIF bonds must mature within twenty years under 
§ 311.015). 
38. Lefcoe, supra note 20, at 467-69. 
39. George Lefcoe & Charles W. Swenson, Redevelopment in California: The Demise of  
TIF-Funded Redevelopment in California and Its Aftermath, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 719 (2014). 
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C. Case Law on Texas TIF 
Although the thirty years since TIF’s arrival in Texas have seen numerous 
TIF-related lawsuits, none has provided substantial direct guidance on the  
issue of “but for.”  The most interesting case from a blight and “but-for”  
perspective concerned the TIF subsidization of a Cabela’s in a prosperous and 
fast growing area of Fort Worth (ironically as we will see, on land bought 
from Hillwood Development).40  Here the legitimacy of the section 311.005 
designation was based upon a stream and pond on the property41and it was  
unsuccessfully challenged by a citizen’s group, although only the issue of 
blight was tried.42  While in the context of the traditional TIF concept of 
blight, the conditions found in Fort Worth did not pass muster, this decision 
highlights the many possible routes through which the Texas blight test has 
effectively become one of underdevelopment.  
In terms of reviewing perceived local government over-permissiveness in 
TIF zone creation, the appellate court in Hardwicke v. City of Lubbock  
outlined that absent arbitrary or “capricious” and willful “disregard of the facts 
and circumstances,” a local decision will be maintained.43  Applied to the 
“but-for” element in the creation of a TIF zone, it appears that any challenge 
will have the substantial hurdles of a wide scope within which local  
government decisions will be deemed defensible, as well as a broader judicial 
reluctance to intervene in such determinations. 
The relatively limited case law on Texas TIF is complemented by a series 
of advisory opinions from the Attorney General’s Office.  Of the fifteen-plus 
opinions on record, the most relevant to the SATD context outlines that a peti-
tioned for TIF zone must meet the standard of “unproductive, underdeveloped 
or blighted” in section 311.005.44  However the assessment of whether this 
standard has been met is in the “good faith” judgment of the local government, 
although subject to (the relatively weak standard of) judicial review.45  Yet  
despite over ten unique issues being addressed through these opinions, there is 
no coverage of “but-for,” although it may implicitly be seen in the same way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40. Dave Montgomery, Cabela’s in Fort Worth Becomes Lightning Rod in Governor’s  
Race, STAR TELEGRAM, Oct. 4, 2014, http://www.star-telegram.com/news/politics-
government/article3876110.html.  
41. Daniel McGraw, Giving Away the Store to Get a Store, REASON, Jan. 2006, 
http://reason.com/archives/2006/01/01/giving-away-the-store-to-get-a.  
42. Id. 
43. Hardwicke v. City of Lubbock, 150 S.W.3d 708, 716 (Tex. App. 2004). 
44. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §311.005 (2017). 
45. TEXAS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, 238 (2015). 
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as blight.46  
D. Literature on TIF in Texas and Dallas 
There have been several works on TIF in Dallas and other major Texas 
cities.  Loessberg evaluated the relative roles and merits of TIF, tax  
abatements, and HUD Section 108 loan guarantees in the Dallas in-town  
housing program, an initiative designed to convert underused office space to 
both populate urban areas and reduce the glut of office square footage on the 
market.47   Although TIF was intended to be a supporting instrument,  
Loessberg argues that TIF has been by far the most successful form of  
assistance, in large part due to its flexibility in being adapted to the  
infrastructure needs of a particular project.48   
In a survey of Dallas TIF district outcomes using data from the City’s  
Office of Economic Development (OED), Bland and Overton found that  
public participation through TIF was an essential element to TIF success.49  In 
particular, they argued that the public side allowed for value maximization 
through leveraging the impact of private investment via “operational and  
institutional knowledge” and project credibility.50  This built upon their  
previous work evaluating the impact of the post-2008 recession on TIF zone 
assessment growth.51  Here Bland and Overton concluded that pre and  
post-recession private investment in a TIF zone were strongly related to the 
total planned TIF expenditures over the district’s lifetime as opposed to annual 
disbursements.52  The recession years however saw a different pattern,  
whereby public outlays of TIF dollars became an important source of tangible 
reassurance to developers of the City’s ongoing investment in TIF success.53  
The findings in both of these articles are quite relevant this Article’s primary 
discussion concerning the SATD.  
At the statewide level, Scott found that adoption of TIF by neighboring  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46. Id. 
47. Rick Loessberg, Eighteen Years Later, 11 ECON. DEV. J. 11, 11–13 (2012). 
48. Id. at 16.  
49. See Robert L. Bland & Michael Overton, Assessing the Contributions of Collaborators in  
Public-Private Partnerships: Evidence from Tax Increment Financing, 46 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 
418, 431 (2016). 
50. Id. at 431–32.  
51. Michael Overton & Robert L. Bland, The Great Recession’s Impact on Credible Commitment: 
An Analysis of Private Investment in Tax Increment Financing, 46 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 282 
(2014). 
52. Id. at 295.  
53. Id.  
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jurisdictions had a measurable positive impact on TIF district size.54  Arvidson 
et al., in a high-level review and survey of TIF use across Texas, set out that 
TIF using jurisdictions have been fairly successful in their primary objectives 
of tax base expansion and business attraction.55  The authors here also noted 
an average private to public spending ratio of 8:1 and the majority of TIF  
projects being funded on some form of a pay-as-you-go basis, as well as TIF 
being more of a petition-driven (as opposed to municipality-driven) exercise in 
most jurisdictions.56  These findings are consistent with the early TIF  
experience in Dallas, the relative success of which has set the stage for  
significant TIF expansion since the article was written, including in the SATD 
at the core of this Article.  
As for how Texas TIF compares across state lines, the broader TIF  
literature has repeatedly placed Texas on the more permissive end of statutory 
TIF schemes.57  However, because of this flexibility, the Texas framework has 
been cited as a template for solving issues in other jurisdictions.  For instance, 
Lefcoe asserts that many of California’s TIF problems could be addressed by 
adopting the Texas process of negotiation with overlaying jurisdictions for 
their increment, and cap for increment percentage of a local government’s  
assessment base.58 
E. Local TIF Policy 
1. City of Dallas 
Both the City and County of Dallas have detailed TIF policies.  The City 
policy outlines a detailed scoring system for prospective TIF districts based on 
a series of financial and policy objectives.  The financial measures include up 
to fifty points for new tax generation exceeding public investment, twenty 
points based on a review of financial projections, and fifteen points for each 
participation from overlaying jurisdictions and whether at least $100 million 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54. Brendan S. Scott, Factors That Influence the Size of Tax Increment Financing Districts in 
Texas (Spring 2013) (unpublished M.P.A dissertation, Texas State University–San Marcos) (on file 
with Texas State University Library). 
55. ENID ARVIDSON ET AL., Tax Increment Financing in Texas: Survey and Assessment, in TAX 
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACTS (Craig 
L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001). 
56. Id.  
57. Id. at 176; David N. Farwell, A Modest Proposal: Eliminating Blight, Abolishing But-For, and 
Putting New Purpose in Wisconsin’s Tax Increment Financing Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 407, 422 
(2005).  
58. See George Lefcoe, Redevelopment in California: Its Abrupt Termination and a  
Texas-Inspired Proposal for a Fresh Start, 43 URB. LAW. 767, 802–05 (2012). 
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of new development will occur within five years.59  Policy benefits are then 
scored on eight criteria.  Twenty-five points are available based on  
enhancement of “core City assets,” twenty points apiece can be had for “direct 
benefits” to distressed areas and enhancement of the public realm, ten points 
for affordable housing provision and design guidelines, and five points for  
impact on green space and compliance with affirmative action guidelines.60  
Financial and policy scores are each maximized at 100 points, with a  
minimum of seventy points in each category needed to move forward.  The 
City also requires a ten percent affordable housing component for all TIF  
districts.61  
While State statute has no TIF sunset requirement, the City standard is 
twenty years.  Where an extension of the City standard is contemplated,  
another list of boxes must (literally) be checked, these concerning new market 
conditions, an extension of financial benefits, and preconditions.62  A TIF  
district can then be extended for a maximum of one additional ten-year period, 
although the TIF plan can be amended on an ongoing basis in response to 
market conditions.63  
Likewise it is worth noting is that sub-districts within existing TIF districts 
can be established.  Here the expiry is linked to the sub-district creation date as 
opposed to the TIF district sunset,64 a model that has been used in the 
SATD.65  New sub-districts can draw on the increment of more established 
districts for the remaining life of the senior district until development allows 
the new sub-district to generate greater (and implicitly self-sustaining)  
increment in its later years.  This is effectively a TIF bond issue for a  
pay-as-you-go TIF model absent the risk of debt.  
2. Dallas County TIF Policy 
Dallas County’s policy is framed by its status as a participant in the TIF 
schemes of its constituent municipalities.  As of December 2016, the County 
participated in twenty-four TIF districts, seventeen of which are within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59. Criteria for Evaluating Proposed TIF Districts, DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., 
https://www.dallasecodev.org/DocumentCenter/Home/View/309 (last visited Dec. 14, 2017).  
60. Id.   
61. Id.  
62. Id.  
63. Id. 
64. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 311.005. 
65. See DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., SPORTS ARENA TIF DISTRICT: AMENDED AND RESTATED 
PROJECT PLAN 5–8 (2012). 
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City of Dallas, accounting for all but one of the City’s active TIF projects.66  
In evaluating prospective TIF participation, the County will first assess a  
proposal against five core gatekeeper criteria.  These criteria are: statutory  
eligibility, an increase in County tax base within three years of final plan  
approval by at least $15 million, a present value analysis demonstrating  
additional tax revenues will equal forgone increment “within a reasonable  
period of time,” sufficient safeguards for the failure of proposed development 
to occur, and no diversion of firms or facilities from another County  
municipality.67  Of these requirements, the “no diversion” requirement is  
particularly notable for explicitly precluding predatory use of TIF within the 
County, but not extending a collaborative approach to neighboring counties, 
the absence of which some suggest predicates a race to the bottom.68  
Upon passing these gatekeepers, the County can elect to provide up to 
thiry-five percent of increment with an additional ten percent able to be  
committed, up to a maximum of seventy-five percent, for meeting each of the 
following: location in a distressed area, an 8:1 ratio of increment to public  
investment over a twenty year period, an exclusive purpose of creating at least 
450 single-family homes with thirty-five percent or more being affordable by 
HUD standards, facilitation of rapid transit use or trail extension, “regional 
economic implications,” and a determination that County participation will 
expedite proposed public investments by a minimum of two years.69  Although 
not all of these criteria are easily met, meeting some is not overly burdensome.  
The County will then more broadly consider impacts on transportation,  
services, the nature of the investment and development, geography, as well as 
the generation of sales and hotel taxes.70  With these latter two components, 
since sales and hotel tax increment are excluded from the County’s  
participation, the ability for a TIF district to offset property tax diversion 
through increased hotel and sales tax revenues seems especially pertinent.  
In Dallas, the natural brake on TIF risk is the County.  A TIF project  
becomes far more powerful with County participation, but the County has a 
different incentive structure and far less of a vested stake than the Dallas OED 
in being viewed as successful.  Instead, the County has to evaluate a project as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66. DALL. CTY. DEPT. PLANNING & DEV., 2016 TIF DISTRICT STATUS REPORT 1–2 (2016), 
https://www.dallascounty.org/department/plandev/documents/2016TIFDistrictStatusReport.pdf (the 
County will begin participation in the remaining TIF district in 2020).  
67. DALL. CTY., DALLAS COUNTY TAX INCREMENT FINANCE POLICY 2–3 (Aug. 2 2011), 
http://www.dallascounty.org/department/plandev/documents/2011tifpolicy.pdf.  
68. See Lefcoe, supra note 20, at 427. 
69. DALL. CTY. DEPT. PLANNING & DEV., supra note 66, at 3–4. 
70. Id.  
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being beneficial in the long run to County revenues and if there is no “but-for” 
threshold met, then its revenue is being transferred from non-Dallas City  
taxpayers to the City for no net benefit.  Thus the extent of County  
participation can be seen as a less biased evaluation of “but-for” and to some 
extent a functional closing of the statutory “but-for” gap. 
III. THE AMERICAN AIRLINES CENTER AND TIF IN THE DALLAS SATD 
A. Overview of the Arena Framework and the SATD 
Passing a 1998 city-wide referendum by a mere 1,642 votes and  
completed in 2001, the AAC was financed and developed under an Arena 
Master Agreement by the City and the Center Operating Company (the COC), 
the latter a joint-venture between the arena’s two major league tenants, the 
Stars of the NHL and the Mavericks of the NBA.  Following the referendum, 
the same year saw the creation of the SATD to reimburse infrastructure and 
public improvements in relation to arena development.  Running parallel to the 
Stemmons Freeway and a DART light rail line, the original SATD ran roughly 
2000 feet north and south of the arena, extending south to the edges of  
downtown and the infamous Texas School Book Depository.71  Formerly a 
railyard and power plant, seventy percent of the site was considered a highly 
contaminated brownfield.72  The geography was also notable for its exclusion 
of entire blocks surrounded by included streets, although this is best explained 
by these blocks already being built-out with public housing and market  
apartments and the City seeing no point in capturing the non-arena related 
market development or the exempt public housing.   
TIF funds were not part of the formula for funding the arena itself, which 
instead saw a public contribution in the form of rental car and hotel taxes, with 
the remaining costs split between the Stars and Mavericks ownership groups.73  
Additional bonds for infrastructure were approved previous to the SATD, but 
insufficiently covered planned improvements.  In terms of Texas Tax Code 
section 311.005, the City went with a deteriorating structures blight  
determination,74 although any number of subsections could have been made 
out considering the legitimately blighted state of the area.  Dallas County  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71. See DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 9. 
72. See DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., REIMAGINING VICTORY PARK:  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE 3 (Oct. 7, 2013), 
https://dallascityhall.com/government/Council%20Meeting%20Documents/2014/ECO_Combined_10
0713.pdf.  
73. CITY OF DALL., ARENA MASTER AGREEMENT 18–21 (Dec. 10, 1997). 
74. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 311.005. 
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contributed one-third of County (and County-controlled Hospital District)  
increment for ten years or until a net present value of $1.93 million was 
achieved.75  The Dallas Independent School District, seemingly a party where 
the benefit experienced would be more tenuously connected, allocated fifty 
percent of its increment with a sunset scheduled for 2013.76  
Alongside the SATD’s creation, the City entered into agreements with the 
COC for certain infrastructure improvements (primarily roadways) to be paid 
for from the TIF fund.77  Instead of borrowing against the projected increment 
through TIF bonds, the COC paid for these costs as they were incurred and  
received priority reimbursement plus agreed interest as increment was  
generated.78  As noted, the interest aspect makes this similar to borrowing 
from a financial perspective, but moves risk from the TIF zone and the City to 
the developer insofar as a priority reimbursement is only valuable if sufficient 
increment is created.    
Beyond the arena and TIF agreements also came three contracts and  
accompanying easements concerning parking rights (the PRAs) between the 
City, the COC, Hillwood Development Company (Hillwood), and the COC’s 
lender.79  The PRAs required 3,000 spaces on Hillwood controlled lots within 
the SATD and 841 of those spaces to be 400 feet or less from the arena.80  
These PRAs also included an easement over the designated lots to the benefit 
of the COC, meaning that lots could only be released from the agreement for 
development upon COC approval.  Further, the PRAs outlined that any  
subsequently displaced parking spaces had to be relocated on the designated 
parking lots prior to a City building permit or certificate of occupancy being 
issued.81 
B. Initial Development in the SATD 
Victory Park, the seventy-five-acre luxury real estate development  
adjoining the AAC, was the grand vision of Ross Perot Jr., the then Mavericks 
owner and principal of Hillwood.  While the first phase of Victory brought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 5. 
76. Id.  
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., SPORTS ARENA TIF DISTRICT—NEXT STEPS  
TIER ONE GARAGE AND DISTRICT STUDY 22–25 (June 4, 2012), 
http://www3.dallascityhall.com/committee_briefings/briefings0612/ECO_SportsArenaTifDistrict_06
0412.pdf.  
80. Id. at 22. 
81. Id. at 24. 
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hundreds of millions of dollars in assessed value to a blighted urban location, 
the project followed a common course for real estate in the late 2000s—
insolvency.  Accordingly some of its more ambitious elements were axed, in-
cluding a forty-three-story Mandarin Orient hotel.82  The stalling in progress, 
combined with overbuilt luxury components relative to market demand,  
contributed to a sterile and largely empty environment on non-event nights.83  
An almost exclusively upscale retail mix was also a poor match for the  
consumption tastes of both lunchtime and game-night traffic, further  
impacting the viability of retail and restaurant businesses.84  
The property tax picture was far less bleak, however, with the OED  
claiming that assessed value increased by over 2,000 percent between 1998 
and 2012.85  The most significant year-over-year increases occurred between 
2006 and 2008, where anticipated captured value leapt from $37 million in 
2005, to $163 million in 2006, $361 million in 2007, and $557 million in 
2008, before a decline consistent with the recession.86  This timeline runs  
parallel to the completion of the first major phase of Victory Park, including 
the W Hotel, several office towers, a twenty-eight story residential tower, and 
multiple lower-rise apartment complexes.87  These overwhelmingly high-end 
developments accounted for almost 800 apartments and condos, 250 hotel 
rooms and 200,000 square feet of retail space.88 
The projects initially reimbursed concerned what was contemplated by the 
original TIF fund agreements, with approximately $32 million spent on road 
construction, extension or revitalization and the remainder of almost $5  
million primarily going to storm drainage and the West End Plaza.89  The total 
cost of the reimbursement by the time of completion in 2012 was over $38 
million, of which roughly $15 million was interest.90  While interest has eaten 
a significant share of generated increment, the SATD has been able to fund its 
intended list of infrastructure projects with reduced risk relative to a TIF bond 
issue (for instance, the post-2008 downturn would not have been experienced 
by the City on this project the same way as if debt had been issued). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82. Schnurman, supra note 1. 
83. Id.  
84. Id.  
85. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 6. 
86. Id. at 36. 
87. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., SPORTS ARENA TIF DISTRICT FY 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2016), 
https://www.dallasecodev.org/DocumentCenter/Home/View/630.   
88. Schnurman, supra note 1. 
89. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 41. 
90. Id. at 23. 
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C. SATD Redux 2012 
The 2012 Amended TIF Plan (Amended Plan) is far more ambitious in 
scope and directed to address the very mixed development experience of  
Victory Park to date.  Beyond major investments in the immediate vicinity of 
the AAC, the geography expanded to two entirely new sub-districts,  
Riverfront Gateway and West Dallas, with the original SATD being  
re-designated as the Victory sub-district.91  The Amended Plan saw the  
Victory sub-district extended through 2028 and the new Riverfront Gateway 
and West Dallas sub-districts set to run until the end of 2042, with an earlier 
sunset possible for all sub-districts if the full project costs are paid.92  Dallas 
County also amended its participation—now the County provides fifty-five 
percent of increment in the new West Dallas and Riverfront Gateway  
sub-districts through 2028, and Victory sub-district increment has increased to 
forty-five percent through 2022.93 
 
Figure 1: The post-amendment Dallas SATD (screen capture from map on 
Dallas OED website) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91. Id. at 9. 
92. Id. at 7–8. 
93. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 87, at 3. 
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Orange/Right/East: Victory sub-district 
Red/Center: Riverfront Gateway sub-district 
Green/Left/West: West Dallas sub-district 
	  
As seen in Figure 1, Riverfront Gateway extends from the southwest edge 
of the Victory sub-district, across the Trinity River, narrowly connecting to the 
West Dallas sub-district and avoiding the neighboring Design District TIF area 
opposite the freeway to Victory altogether.  This creative mapmaking has  
produced a new SATD, which bears more than a passing resemblance to a  
gerrymandered political ward.  When viewed in the context of the Amended 
Plan TIF, where West Dallas accounts for one-third of projected spending and 
Riverfront Gateway less than five percent,94 the objective seems to be to  
leverage development in Victory Park for the benefit of West Dallas.  In fact, 
the Amended Plan document explicitly outlines that ten percent of Victory  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 22. 
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increment will be reallocated to West Dallas, 95 a traditionally poor, blighted, 
and contaminated neighborhood.96  
The Amended Plan had ten primary goals, overwhelmingly focused on 
rectifying Victory’s previously mentioned planning and development  
shortcomings.97  With the former, the OED outlined that the street network 
was designed to move event traffic and cut-off Victory from neighboring  
clusters of development,98 with attendees having no reason to travel down the 
development’s commercial spine.  Combined with a poorly designed retail 
landscape that failed to attract business from the event and office traffic  
Victory did garner,99 the development’s issues were punctuated by an absence 
of sufficient density, in large part due to the PRA restrictions.  On a  
quantitative plane, the Amended Plan also proposed attracting new private  
investments totaling almost $1 billion, including at least 250,000 square feet of 
new retail space and 3,000 additional housing units, while ensuring that this 
time there was a diversity in retail, commercial, and residential mixes.100  
With over 243,000 square feet of retail space and 3,151 residential units  
completed or under construction through 2016, these construction objectives 
are well on their way to being greatly exceeded.101  
The OED and City Planning Department believed that the SATD  
development objectives could be best facilitated through using increment to 
build parking structures to eliminate over twelve acres of surface lots  
effectively mandated by the PRAs.102  Thus, the overwhelming increment  
focus in the Amended Plan was on parking garages, with the two completed in 
2014 and 2015 lifting the SATD to over 3,600 garage spaces.103  One of these 
garages was built on the abandoned Mandarin Oriental site and includes a 
street-facing retail component that will soon provide a more complete block of 
Victory Park Lane across from both the W Hotel and AT&T Plaza (the local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95. Id. at 35. 
96. See id. at 6; see also Valerie Wigglesworth, The Burden of Lead: West Dallas  
Deals With Contamination Decades Later, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Dec. 2012, 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2012/12/14/the-burden-of-lead-west-dallas-deals-with-
contamination-decades-later.  
97. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 10. 
98. See id. at 10, 15; DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 7, 16, 20. 
99. Schnurman, supra note 1. 
100. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 10. 
101. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 87, at 13. 
102. Id. at 12. 
103. Id. at 9 (however the original 2,000-space Platinum Garage does not count towards the  
3,000-spot requirement under the PRAs; see DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 79, at 22). 
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attempt to replicate Times Square,104 minus sustained vibrancy and human 
presence).105   
Most of the remaining TIF spend has gone to street improvements focused 
on placemaking; sidewalk widening on key pedestrian thoroughfares to allow 
for flow; and ancillary uses (such as patios), traffic calming, and bike lanes.106  
However the first almost $2.7 million of increment has flowed to reimbursing 
planning and consulting fees from the COC and Hillwood under the TIF grant 
program, authorized by section 311.010(h) of the Texas Tax Code.107  These 
priority allocations strongly relate to the discussions of “but-for” and capture 
below. 
IV. CRITICAL LENSES OF TIF AND THE SATD 
A. “But-For” and Developer Capture 
In the most comprehensive review of six common TIF criticisms, Lefcoe 
isolates two interrelated sets of “convincing” issues, the first and most relevant 
to this Article being that a “but-for” standard is often not adhered to, leading to 
developer-driven TIF projects that capture unnecessary subsidies.108   
Secondly, Lefcoe sets out that these transactions are often accompanied by a 
lack of public transparency that benefits the cause of welfare-seeking  
developers, as well as politicians and development agencies in pursuit of  
specific development and political objectives.109  In Dallas, both these  
criticisms exist accompanied by the transparency issue, but the local overlap 
lends to a better-organized conversation under the intertwined headings of 
“but-for” and developer capture.  
1. “But-For” 
Starting with “but-for,” most jurisdictions that have an explicit “but-for” 
test set out that without public subsidy private investment would not occur at 
the site in the “reasonably foreseeable future.”110  With some tests, the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104. David S. Jones & Harold D. Hunt, V For Victory: Development Transforms  
Industrial Wasteland, 1877 TIERRA GRANDE, 3 (Oct. 2002), 
https://assets.recenter.tamu.edu/documents/articles/1877.pdf. 
105. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 87, at 6. 
106. Id. at 10. 
107. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 31. 
108. Lefcoe, supra note 20, at 467. 
109. See id. at 471–73. 
110. Id. at 467. 
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standard is weakened with caveats that development would not happen as 
quickly, or with the same scale and benefit to the public.111  In Dallas, TIF is 
subject to the blanket test that “but-for” the incentives sought, the proposed 
project would be “substantially altered such that the economic returns to the 
city would be reduced or the project would not otherwise occur in the city.”112 
This mirrors the State statutory standard, and as far as the strict language goes, 
this test is far from the most permissive end of the spectrum.113  However, 
strict language matters less than standards of interpretation and enforcement. 
Lefcoe outlines that ideally “but-for” will be assessed with detailed  
financial data, checked by outside auditors, and then presented alongside  
specific explanations on why particular aspects of the development justify a 
TIF subsidy and why such a subsidy is the most efficient prospective use for 
public monies.114  In Dallas, the OED provides in-depth and easy to access  
information on year-to-year TIF results, but the TIF plan explanation of how 
the “but-for” standard was measured and deemed met is lacking.  Beyond  
outlining that the SATD was created to reimburse public improvements  
“necessary or beneficial for the development of the American Airlines Center 
and private development within the surrounding area, which such development 
or redevelopment would not otherwise occur solely through private investment 
in the reasonably foreseeable future,” there is no further detail on why TIF was 
necessary.115 
While the TIF plan imports the “but-for” language from section 311.003 
of the Texas Tax Code to meet the statutory standard, and thus formal legality, 
from a strict interpretation perspective, instead of satisfying that a detailed  
assessment of “but-for” has been undertaken, it merely highlights the  
permissive and subjective standard, as well as the lack of “but-for”  
enforcement in Texas.  Although there have been multiple decisions on the  
issue of blight or underdevelopment, as noted, there has been a lack of judicial 
guidance on “but-for.”116  Where there has been direction on the TIF issue, 
case law and reference opinions from the Texas Attorney General have shown 
deference to specific local government determinations of blight under section 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111. E.g. id at 467–68. 
112. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM REVIEW 13 (Dec. 5, 
2016), 
http://dallascityhall.com/government/Council%20Meeting%20Documents/eco_3_publicprivatepartne
rshipprogramreview_combined_120516.pdf. 
113. See Farwell, supra note 57. 
114. Lefcoe, supra note 20, at 468. 
115. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 4. 
116. See infra Part I Section C.  
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311.005 so long as the necessary elements can be made out in the first-place 
under a literal and plain meaning statutory interpretation.117  Combined with 
judicial deference to local government decisions on land use in general,118 
even TIF-opposing elected officials from large cities operated  
(contemporaneously to the SATD project) on the assumption that broad local 
discretion exists on the process and finding of “but-for” and that this  
represents a “real open hole in the statute.”119  
Yet beyond the State statutory standard, the SATD project does not seem 
to necessarily meet the City standard for project assistance “that ‘but for’ the 
incentives sought, the proposed project would be substantially altered such 
that the economic returns to the city would be reduced or the project would not 
otherwise occur in the city.”120  Even if there was a legitimate finding under 
the City standard, neither the TIF plan nor readily available OED documents 
provide any detail or discussion on how this decision was made.  Combined 
with weak State “but-for” enforcement, a transparency-based critique of the 
SATD gains credibility.   
With the Arena Master Agreement and Perot ownership options over, and 
vision for, most of the surrounding parcels,121 it seems that much of the initial 
phase of development would have occurred with the construction of the arena.  
The question, based on the formal justification provided by the City, then  
becomes threefold:  
 
1. Would the arena have occurred as it did without the 
TIF district being part of the Arena Master Agreement 
with the City? 
2. Would the Victory development have happened with 
only the arena being subsidized? 
3. Did the use of TIF facilitate faster or more substantial 
development than would have otherwise occurred in 
the absence of TIF after the formal authorization in 
1998 of the TIF contemplated in the Arena Master 
Agreement? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117. See, Texas Municipal League, supra note 45, at 238. 
118. John J. Hightower, Selected Issues in Land Use Litigation, 7–13 (2007), 
http://www.olsonllp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/landuseleg.pdf.  
119. Lynn J. Cook, Turmoil in the Summer of TIRZ, HOUS. BUS. J., August 8, 1999, 
http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/1999/08/09/story1.html. 
120. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 112, at 13. 
121. CITY OF DALL., supra note 73, at 31. 
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On the first count, it seems unlikely that the absence of a $24 million  
infrastructure contribution would cause the Stars and Mavericks to walk away 
from their preferred location and $125 million in direct arena subsidies.   
Despite on-ice success, the Stars were hemorrhaging money in the AAC’s 
predecessor, Reunion Arena, and ownership was eyeing new revenues from 
luxury boxes to close the deficit and then sell the team at a profit.122   
Combined with Hillwood having acquired rights to (contingent on a successful 
arena referendum) forty-six acres of land surrounding this preferred  
location,123 the argument that if the City failed to provide a TIF district that 
the first phase of Victory Park would not have materialized is highly  
questionable, especially considering that Victory was something of a vanity 
project for one of the state’s wealthiest families.  
In fact, the reason Perot acquired the Mavericks in 1996 was to realize a 
vision for a master-planned urban district centered on a new arena—without 
the team, Perot had little leverage124 and without the prospect of a major 
downtown development Perot had little interest in basketball.125  Although 
several sites were supposedly considered, Perot himself noted that a location at 
the south end of the Dallas North Tollway was important as eighty percent of 
season ticket customers at Reunion Arena lived within one mile of this 
road.126  The only sufficient concentration of urban land at its south end was 
the contaminated brownfield-turned Victory site. According to Perot, “[w]e 
picked that area north of the West End because it was the last blighted area . . . 
it was an area where you could have a big impact.''127  Once Perot achieved his 
arena deal, the Mavericks were sold to Mark Cuban for a reported $285  
million prior to the AAC even opening, more than doubling Perot’s investment 
in less than four years,128 and inadvertently setting the stage for future clashes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122. Dan McGraw, Is Tom Hicks Going Broke?, D MAG., July 2002, 
https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2002/july/is-tom-hicks-going-broke/. 
123. CITY OF DALL., supra note 73, at 31. 
124. Jones & Hunt, supra note 104, at 2 
125. Mark Donald, Business: The Education of Tom Hicks, D MAG., Nov. 1997, 
https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/1997/november/business-the-education-of-
tom-hicks/.  
126. Jones & Hunt, supra note 104, at 2. 
127. Michael Brick, Commercial Real Estate; Downtown Dallas Project Mired in Disputes, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/01/business/commercial-real-estate-
downtown-dallas-project-mired-in-disputes.html. 
128. Dwain Price, Timeline: It Was 15 Years Ago that Mark Cuban Bought the Mavericks,  
STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 3, 2015, http://www.star-telegram.com/sports/nba/dallas-
mavericks/article5394174.html.  
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over parking. 
Likewise, in the absence of TIF subsidies and given the structure of the 
Arena Master Agreement, it is hard to accept that Perot and Hillwood would 
simply let controlled land adjacent to the arena with hundreds of millions of 
dollars in planned construction lay fallow because a comparatively minimal 
infrastructure subsidy was not reimbursed.  The entire point of acquiring the 
Mavericks was to build an arena near downtown Dallas that could be the  
anchor of a major real estate development129—again, why would Perot turn 
away after the arena anchor was funded?  The TIF as a development accelerant 
argument is further undermined by the funds for infrastructure being spent out 
of pocket years in advance of TIF reimbursement.  While it may be suggested 
that the priority repayment guarantee provided collateral upon which the  
developer could borrow and thus accelerate access to capital for subsequent 
development, Perot was seemingly not lacking for finance at the time.  Instead, 
the more likely brake would seem to be market demand, which is supported by 
the first phase outcomes.  
However, the development accelerant argument is not without some merit.  
There are newspaper reports from the 1998–2003 period showing continued 
wrangling between the City, the COC, and the involved development  
companies on what would be built by whom, on what timeline, what share of 
public infrastructure subsidy would be granted, and whether that subsidy 
would be reimbursed or paid for via bond issue.130  Although the development 
had $600 million in financing by 2002, ground had not been broken, and the 
proposed structure of the deal whereby the COC would actually sell the land, 
upon which the first phase of Victory was built to a third-party developer  
(Palladium) and retain a minority stake, fell through.131  It took until 2003 for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129. Jones & Hunt, supra note 104, at 2. 
130. E.g., Thomas Korosec, The Thing That Ate Downtown: Downtown’s Real Estate Barons Are 
Terrified That Perot-Hicks Slick Victory Project Could Wreak Havoc on Their Own  
Tax-Funded Plans to Fix the City’s Core, DALLAS OBSERVER, Nov. 29 2001, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/407196068?pq-origsite=summon&accountid=14667; Dave 
Michaels, Developer Cuts Request for Dallas Funding of Downtown Project,  
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 30, 2002, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/0F08578130A6320E?p=AWNB; Lisa Sanders, 
Deal in Focus: After Years of Wrangling, Dallas is Coming Through With Bonds  
for Arena, BOND BUYER, June 16 1998, https://search.proquest.com/docview/407196068?pq-
origsite=summon&accountid=14667; Mitchell Schnurman, Deal Too Good for Dallas 
 to Ignore, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 19 2001, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/0F08578130A6320E?p=AWNB; Richard  
Williamson, Dallas City Council Agrees to Funding for Pair of TIF Projects, BOND BUYER, May 24 
2002, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/0F08578130A6320E?p=AWNB. 
131. Brick, supra note 127. 
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the first post-arena construction to commence and the parties involved cited 
the first round of $24 million in TIF commitments as being an insufficient  
incentive and floated multiple bond issue scenarios that would either exceed or 
replace the TIF commitment.132  In this sense, the argument can be made that 
the project returns (increased property assessments and economic activity in 
the zone) were delayed by the absence of subsidy, although the problem is that 
the subsidy in question (approved in 2000) was deemed insufficient by the  
developers to influence them to start construction before they eventually did so 
in 2003.133 
Instead, it seems that market conditions were far more influential than TIF 
or other subsidies on the actual commencement of construction.  Dallas, at the 
time, had a glut of competing office space and a luxury apartment surplus.134  
Combined with 9/11 impacting the perceived viability of new hotel  
projects,135 an issue as the Victory centerpiece was the W Hotel.  As well as 
the actual performance of Victory’s first post-arena phase, it seems that market 
demand was more of a brake and influence on development timelines than the 
presence or absence of TIF.  To this end (then Stars owner and forty-three  
percent partner in the arena-adjacent land holdings136) Tom Hicks noted in 
2005 that construction would commence on the primary office element once 
fifty percent was pre-leased.137 
So while the City’s “but-for” standard may have to a certain extent been 
met at various points after the fact, it did not seem to reasonably exist at the 
time of the TIF authorization ordinance in 1998, which is the point that the 
City’s own documents seem to have evaluated “but-for.”  The “but-for”  
argument is further undermined by the TIF subsidy guarantee not being a  
sufficient incentive to spur the initial post-arena development faster than  
market demand dictated.  Yet with no precedent to indicate that local  
government prerogative to assess the State or local government standards of 
“but-for” is at issue, and little propensity for judicial review of such standards 
in Texas,138 there is no foreseeable legal consequence to a loose interpretation 
that serves a desired political outcome.  Indeed the laissez-faire judicial  
approach to TIF review has helped create the scope for further and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132. Id.  
133. Id.  
134. Id. 
135. See Schnurman, supra note 1. 
136. Brick, supra note 127. 
137. Christine Perez, A Tale of Two Office Markets, NAT’L REAL EST. INVESTOR, July 1, 2005, 
http://nreionline.com/mag/tale-two-office-submarkets.  
138. See Hightower, supra note 118, at 7–13. 
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self-reinforcing proliferation of loose standards—cities are effectively free to 
do what they wish within the fifteen percent of their assessment base that can 
be included in a TIF zone. 
There is also a somewhat different element of “but-for” in the  
post-recession phase of the SATD with the Amended Plan.  The aftermath of 
2008 saw Hillwood’s German financiers take control of Victory, leaving  
Hillwood with ownership of undeveloped SATD land at the time bound by the 
PRAs, and only in a management role over what had been built.139   
Considering the financial uncertainty of the recession, the oversupply of  
luxury residential, the perception of initial failure, and the primary ownership 
interest now residing with a party other than that which was the visionary  
driving force, there were legitimate questions concerning the speed of further 
development.  In turn, the State standard of “but-for” (that in the reasonably 
foreseeable future private finance alone would not solely cause development) 
is more likely to have been met in the post-2008 years leading up to the 2012 
Amended Plan.  
Beyond the recession and finance issues however, even as the economy 
has recovered and strong development has been seen in Victory and  
neighboring areas, the PRAs have still limited the speed of build-out by  
necessitating parking replacement within the SATD.  Typically the  
construction of parking garages is a less efficient investment for a developer, 
and this may be accentuated where the build-out of uses that can make for a 
strong internal rate of return on parking (such as commuter commercial office 
space) is incomplete and there are ample lower cost alternatives (such as  
surface lots).140  While event periods provide obviously stronger demand, they 
overlap with downtimes for commuter parking, allowing commuter parking to 
undercut the event premium.  In the SATD, the mandated space requirements 
have retained a glut of surface lots, which has reduced the viability of parking 
garages.  
Thus the City’s TIF subsidization of a necessary but less attractive  
investment for the private sector (especially considering the change in  
Victory’s ownership), may be the strongest fulfillment of “but-for” in the  
entire twenty-year exercise.  However, this is undermined by the driving cause 
of “but-for” being artificially imposed minimum parking requirements.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139. Robert Wilonsky, Now Victory is Theirs, as Hillwood Officially Hands Over Victory Park to 
Germans, DALLAS OBSERVER, July 7, 2009, http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/now-victory-is-
theirs-as-hillwood-officially-hands-over-victory-park-to-germans-7122918.  
140. See generally Richard Arnott, Spatial Competition Between Parking Garages and Downtown 
Parking Policy, 13 TRANSP. POL’Y 458, (2006); VICTORIA TRANSP, POL’Y INST., TRANSP. COST & 
BENEFIT ANALYSIS II—PARKING COSTS (2017), http://www.vtpi.org/tca/tca0504.pdf. 
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Absent the PRAs many of the surface lots would not have had to await the 
construction of garages for development to commence.  In turn, especially 
considering the strong construction market immediately outside of where the 
PRAs apply,141 surface lots would have likely been more rapidly built upon 
and garages would have more quickly become financially viable due to the  
reduced surface lot competition and increased demand from build-out.  
2. Capture 
Intertwined with the analysis of “but-for” is the issue of capture  
throughout the SATD development, including the arena construction, as well 
as the pre and post-recession phases of Victory Park.  In each period the  
incentives, objectives, and options present for the driving government and  
development parties have uniquely altered the form and outcomes of capture.  
However, the oscillating phases of bargaining have seen the underlying theme 
of the City’s actions framed by its competition with other jurisdictions for  
desirable forms of development and population, and the ability of the involved 
developer parties to exploit, capture, and monetize the City’s pursuit of those 
ends.  Furthermore, this sequence and the subsequent outcomes can be largely 
viewed through the lens of basic bargaining theory, namely that the involved 
developer parties used the timely exercise of both “outside” then “inside”  
options to leverage public means (such as TIF) to their benefit, with the City 
left to make the most out of ever more limited and unattractive alternatives.142 
a. What Is Capture? 
There is little consensus on the definition and conceptual scope of capture.  
Wilson views capture as occurring “when most or all of the benefits of a  
program go to some single, reasonably small interest (and industry, profession, 
or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of  
people (for example, all taxpayers).”143  Capture can also be thought of as a 
spectrum between more broad and narrow definitions.144  Dal Bo proposes 
that broadly “regulatory capture is the process through which special interests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141. See DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., DOWNTOWN CONNECTION TIF DIST. FY 2016 ANN. REPORT 7 
(2016), http://www.dallasecodev.org/DocumentCenter/Home/View/654 (on the Map of Projects, the 
Victory sub-district is immediately adjacent to the west of the concentration of purple). 
142. Abhinay Muthoo, A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory, 1 WORLD ECON. 
145, 149 (2000). 
143. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY 
DO IT 76 (1989).  
144. Liam Wren-Lewis, Regulatory Capture: Risks and Solutions § 7.1 (2010). 
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affect state intervention in any of its forms,” while it is more “specifically the 
process through which regulated monopolies end up manipulating the state 
agencies that are supposed to control them.”145  Closely related to capture is 
the principal-agent problem whereby an agent acting for a principal is  
incentivized to act in its own best interests as opposed to those of its  
principal.146  This problem is often compounded by information asymmetry 
where the agent’s position becomes further entrenched through the absence of 
an informational basis for the principal or third parties to attack questionable 
practices.147   
In the case of the SATD, this section argues that the developer interests 
leveraged their bargaining position and asymmetric information to create a  
de-facto monopoly within the SATD, which was able to affect the range of  
options available to the City, and allowed for the subsequent manipulation of 
the City’s local economic development agency (the OED).  In turn, the agency 
itself was able to use information asymmetry to implement outcomes that  
benefited the agency’s own interests more than those of the general polity.  
However, the benefit to the agency’s welfare was eclipsed by the upside that 
the special-interest group (the developer parties) experienced. 
b. Capture in the SATD 
The initial arena deal phase saw the City seemingly driven by two related 
objectives: retaining the teams within the City and transforming its central 
core neighborhoods from a commuter office cluster to a more diversified  
urban experience with a stronger tax base that could compete with the suburbs.  
By 1995 Dallas had elected Ron Kirk, who had explicitly prioritized a new 
downtown arena as central to the fight against tax base erosion.148  While the 
previous ownership of the Stars and Mavericks had lobbied hard for a new  
facility and threatened suburban relocation, public professional sports  
subsidies were a hard sell with taxpayers still paying debt from the then fifteen 
year-old Reunion Arena.149  These difficulties were consistent with literature 
showing that high-growth western and southern “frontier” cities lack the  
entrenched local growth coalitions and economic desperation of older cities in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145. Id.; Ernesto Dal Bo, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OX. REV. ECON. POL. 203, (2006). 
146. See Frederic Boehm, Regulatory Capture Revisited – Lessons from Economics of Corruption 
10 (Internet Centre for Corruption Research, Working Paper No. 22, 2007); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT 
& JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 486 (1993).  
147. See Boehm id. 
148. Scott Pendleton, How Ron Kirk Plans to Captain Dallas, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 8 
1995, http://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0508/08041.html. 
149. Id.  
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the Northeast and Midwest that drove publicly funded projects in these  
locales.150  The same study outlined that arena proposals pushed primarily by 
teams and local government figures, as opposed to strong local growth  
coalitions, faced more substantial hurdles through more directly visualized 
corporate welfare.151 
For Dallas then, with the absence of an entrenched local growth coalition 
to take the lead, the answer came in much the same form as it had for Reunion 
Arena—a promise of major master-planned private real estate development 
centered on a publicly funded arena.152  This sort of promised ancillary real 
estate development has also been successful in helping to bring new facilities 
to cities such as San Diego and St. Louis.153  Despite the uneven outcomes of 
the Reunion project, Perot’s acquisition of the Mavericks to facilitate an  
arena-driven urban development was the value-add needed to build a sufficient 
political coalition to surmount the structural obstacles and move the process 
forward.154  
In the stops and starts of deal-making, with lingering memories of losing 
the Cowboys to suburban Irving and failed development promises around  
Reunion Arena,155 TIF was a relatively benign addition to both sweeten the 
deal for the teams and add incentive that would only be realized upon delivery 
of the promised real estate development.  Although with the stated goal of  
using public funding sources, which would supposedly not be borne by local 
taxpayers through so-called “tourist taxes,”156 there were alternatives more  
directly tied to the arena to increase the upfront public funding package.  
However, options such as ticket or arena parking taxes would have cost the 
teams more on the backend through limiting their room for price increases.157  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150. See Kevin J. Delaney & Rick Eckstein, Local Growth Coalitions, Publicly Subsidized Sports 
Stadiums and Social Inequality, 30 HUMANITY & SOC. 84, 100 (2006).  
151. Id. at 97.  
152. A History of the Tower, D MAG., May 2013, http://realestate.dmagazine.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Historical-Timeline.pdf. 
153. Anna O. Bentley, et al., It Takes a Ballpark Village: Stadiums, Coalitions, and Growth in 
Two Cities, MIT DEP’T URB. STUD. PLAN. 71 (June 2006); see Michael B. Cantor & Mark S. Rosen-
traub, A Ballpark and Neighborhood Change: Economic Integration, a Recession, and the Altered 
Demography of San Diego, 3 CITY CULTURE & SOC. 219 (2012). 
154. See generally Wick Allison, Out Front Will Dallas Blow It Again? Why the New Arena Must 
Be Downtown, D MAG., July 1996, https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-
magazine/1996/july/out-front-will-dallas-blow-it-again-why-the-new-arena-must-be-downtown/. 
155. See Laura Miller, Priced to Sell Out, DALL. OBSERVER, Nov. 6, 1997, 
http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/priced-to-sell-out-6402427. 
156. See DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 4. 
157. See Miller, supra note 155. 
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Thus TIF can be seen as the next best option for both the clubs and the City, 
with the theory being that the subsidy would only arise if development were 
delivered, regardless of whether or not the subsidy spurred faster development.  
With eyes fixed on first building the arena to retain the teams and using 
the promise of adjacent development to build an arena coalition, the City was 
primed to be captured by the developer parties in ways that did not cost the 
taxpayer up-front and that were not likely to be issues in the near future.  The 
manifestation of this capture was the TIF subsidy that had questionable  
relation to spurring development on a “but-for” standard, and the PRAs that 
hamstrung build-out in more recent years.  Yet at the time, the political  
objective of building the arena and retaining the teams was achieved alongside 
the likely realization of a potentially transformational neighboring  
development—efficiency or mitigating against what should have been  
foreseeable but longer-horizon problems were not likely to get in the way of 
the primary objectives.   
Further, while these issues should have been foreseeable by sophisticated 
parties, less sophisticated opponents (or the public) would have more difficulty 
identifying both the possible issues and their adverse consequences.  However, 
the problem of capture driven by asymmetric information took a unique turn in 
this instance as Hillwood itself partially miscalculated—the primary issue with 
the PRAs has debatably inflicted greater pain on Hillwood than the City.158  
Namely, the PRAs were to the benefit of the City and the lease-holding clubs, 
the Stars and Mavericks.159  At the time of the PRAs, since the teams were 
owned by parties directly invested in and driving ancillary development,  
making the PRAs to the benefit of the clubs seemed to be a means of  
protecting club resale value by ensuring that the teams would have sufficient 
nearby parking.  However in the context of Perot’s initial interest in the  
Mavericks stemming solely from real estate development, when Perot sold the 
club to Mark Cuban in 2000 (albeit at a hefty profit), the benefit of the PRAs 
passed to an owner far more concerned with ensuring adequate event  
parking160 than sacrificing fan convenience for someone else’s grand real  
estate ambitions.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158. See Brendan Case, Ross Perot Jr., Mark Cuban Battle Over American Airlines Center  
Parking, DALLAS NEWS, Dec. 2011, https://www.dallasnews.com/business/business/2011/12/22/ross-
perot-jr.-mark-cuban-battle-over-american-airlines-center-parking. 
159. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 79. 
160. See Case, supra note 158. 
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c. Bargaining and Capture After Arena Construction 
The initial post-arena deal problem however stemmed from Hillwood and 
Perot being able to dictate the pace of development as they saw fit, made  
evident when shovels failed to break ground on projects beyond the arena.  As 
Hillwood attempted to extract a more generous subsidy package than had  
already been authorized, the City Council, now with the arena built and vocal 
arena opponent Laura Miller161 in the mayor’s pulpit, had far less will to give 
in.  Combined with no contractual obligation162 to provide adjoining real  
estate development as was the case in San Diego (generally regarded as one of 
the more successful facility centered real estate developments in the United 
States),163 as well as the less attractive post-9/11 finance and market  
landscape, the parties were at an impasse.164  
In this instance there was a mutual breakdown driven by two exogenous 
interventions:165 the election of the arena deal’s strongest public opponent as 
mayor and the change in market conditions.  Instead of spurring impatience 
(the valuing of time over money) from one or both of the parties to cause a 
deal to close quicker,166 the breakdown did the opposite.  Here the developer 
was willing to wait out the recession or receive a further subsidy to move more 
quickly, and the City Council at this point was not open to new subsidies.167  
This impasse was accentuated by the developer parties’ “inside” option168—
their control of the undeveloped SATD lands allowed them to benefit through 
increased demand for both developed and bare land if the recession was  
waited out.  
Hillwood’s inside option can likewise be viewed as a form of capture over 
the OED insofar as the COC and Hillwood, through their exclusive ownership 
of developable SATD lands, were the only means through which the OED 
could achieve what would appear to be its best outcome.  While the OED is 
City Council’s agent, it has an institutional incentive for success in its  
economic redevelopment programs,169 the most significant and localized of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161. See Miller, supra note 155. 
162. CITY OF DALL., supra note 73. 
163. See generally Cantor & Rosentraub, supra note 153. 
164. See Muthoo, supra note 142, at 148.  
165. See id. at 152–53 (for an explanation of exogenous driven breakdown).  
166. See id. at 150–52 (for a discussion of impatience). 
167. See Brick, supra note 127. 
168. See Muthoo, supra note 142, at 149 (for an overview of an “inside option”). 
169. See Mark Schneider, Fragmentation and the Growth of Local Government, 48 PUBLIC 
CHOICE 3 255, 256 (1986). 
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which are TIF and Public Improvement Districts.170  Thus, while the City at 
this point had leadership far less politically interested in further subsidizing 
Hillwood, and the optimal public benefit outcome would have likely been  
expedient development with no new subsidies, the OED’s internal incentive 
was to assist in the execution of a successful TIF district in terms of both  
visual transformation and assessed value increases.   
For the OED, a bolstered TIF incentive could demonstrate the validity of 
“but-for” and showcase a TIF success story directly prompting development.  
However, when the developer parties revealed their preferred further subsidy 
to be some form of general bond issue as opposed to expanded TIF, or even in 
lieu of TIF altogether,171 there became far less institutional incentive for the 
OED to desire, let alone actively pursue a non-TIF centered outcome.  Thus, 
no further development occurred until a market recovery repaired the  
“breakdown.”172  
While all parties were generally pleased with the market-prompted  
development from 2003 to 2008 period, the Great Recession changed matters 
significantly.  Beyond the stalling of construction leaving Victory in a  
seemingly half-finished state, the previously noted urban planning failures and 
the transfer of ownership interest for the completed portions of Victory  
contributed to a second breakdown.173  Here the entry of new ownership for 
Victory and the sports teams, the weakening of the original developer parties, 
and natural turnover in elected officials, all still bound by the original  
framework, left the City as the party with the greatest capacity to rectify the 
situation.  With newly-elected officials having a questionable political stake in 
decisions made more than a decade prior, the operationalization of the City’s 
capacity to act came from the institutional interest of the OED in seeing a  
successful SATD project.  
d. The Amended Plan 
The 2012 Amended Plan was the core element of this course correction.  
This Plan had two primary objectives: first to rectify the public realm  
shortcomings, and secondly to build parking garages to free surface lots for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170. The OED currently has eighteen TIF districts and fourteen PIDs, which make up the  
overwhelming bulk of its economic redevelopment programs in terms of investment and exposure.  
See DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., Programs, https://www.dallasecodev.org/251/Programs (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2017). 
171. See Brick, supra note 127. 
172. Id.  
173. Schnurman, supra note 1. 
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construction.174  Alongside the obvious perception that public funds were  
being used to correct Hillwood’s mistakes to the primary benefit of Hillwood 
(still the owner of most undeveloped surface lots in the SATD) implicitly 
came the inclusion of a third objective to construct the necessary political  
coalition.  This third objective was to divert increment from the SATD to fund 
a new sub-district in West Dallas, a long blighted and traditionally poor  
neighborhood on the other side of the Trinity River.  To solve the problem of a 
Texas TIF district needing to be geographically contiguous, a second long and 
narrow new sub-district, Riverfront Gateway, was also added.175  With almost 
all of the non-Victory increment allocated to West Dallas,176 Riverfront  
Gateway can be literally viewed as a money funnel to West Dallas. 
The benefit of attaching a West Dallas sub-district to the SATD  
amendment as opposed to creating a new TIF district is that increment has 
flowed much faster than it otherwise would have for an area where developer 
interest is weak.  In West Dallas, while assessed value has increased from the 
1998 base of $11.6 million to $25 million in 2016, this translates into less than 
$100,000 in increment for the City177 and is well below the 2012  
projections.178  Compared to the hundreds of millions of dollars in increment 
generated by the SATD, the up-front effect is similar to that of a TIF bond  
issue without the corresponding interest or risk.  
This approach to West Dallas TIF was likely informed by the challenges 
of the Grand Park South TIF district, which shares similar demographics and 
core proximity with West Dallas, and has been rated by Dallas County as the 
least successful TIF district that the County participates in.179  Despite the 
opening of a light rail station in the district, developer interest has been  
lacking, leading to assessment gains not meeting projections180 and the stalling 
of improvements that could theoretically spur developer interest.  Ironically 
enough, in the process of political logrolling to attach the West Dallas  
sub-district, the SATD perhaps found its strongest organic component of  
“but-for”	   —West Dallas was truly blighted and there was seemingly little  
prospect for major development in the near future without public subsidy.   
With the siphoning of a significant share of increment to West Dallas, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 22. 
175. Id. 
176. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 22. 
177. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 87, at 23. 
178. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 37. 
179. DALL. CTY. DEPT. PLAN. & DEV, supra note 66, at 6. 
180. Id. at 3. 
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political coalition was in place to fund the triage job necessary to transform 
Victory into a completed TIF success story.  The importance of West Dallas, 
alongside the residue of previous developer capture, can be seen through the 
priority of TIF reimbursement in the Amended Plan.  After pre-existing  
obligations, the first priority went to interest bearing grants in equal amounts 
to Hillwood and the COC for parking-related consulting, and the West Dallas 
“set-aside” received second priority.181  These priorities were most notably in 
advance of funding for the parking garages that would negate the adverse  
impacts of the PRAs.182 
While the West Dallas priority can be logically attributed the necessity of 
political coalition building for the Amended Plan, the consulting fees were 
more puzzling.  In a strengthening nearby real estate market, Hillwood  
seemingly had even more to gain from a quick resolution of the parking  
situation and no real bargaining power over the City to extract the priority 
concession.  On their face, the parking consulting fees were a direct public 
subsidy to study a mostly private problem mainly created by the private parties 
subsidized to study the problem.  By 2012 however, arena parking had become 
the subject of multiple lawsuits between Perot and Cuban,183 and the COC,  
instead of being a joint venture between Perot and Hicks, had passed along 
with the majority stakes in the Mavericks and Stars to Cuban and Tom 
Gaglardi respectively.  Thus, the priority can be seen as a “children play nice” 
grant—an attempt to facilitate a solution to the parking issue that could satisfy 
all parties with the City, through the OED, trading the reimbursement priority 
for expediency.  
While rewarding the spats of billionaires may not seem like a subsidy that 
would pass public scrutiny, it can be explained through the concept of slack.  
As described by Levine, in the broader regulatory capture context, “slack” is 
created by “high information, monitoring and organization costs” that protect 
bureaucrats and politicians from being held accountable—the public has  
insufficient “incentive to learn issues well enough to comprehend their impact 
or to monitor and discipline the behavior of all those officials whose acts 
might affect them.”184  While Levine asserts that slack can be used to benefit 
special interests in return for campaign contributions, support for appointment, 
or future private sector opportunities,185 there is nothing to suggest anything as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 31–33. 
182. Id.  
183. See Case, supra note 158. 
184. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the  
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 185 (1990). 
185. Id. 
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nefarious in the SATD context.  Instead, slack was more likely used to move a 
project forward that the OED could honestly believe was of benefit to the 
greater polity, while also promoting the OED’s institutional utility.  
Thus the slack-covered sausage-making process to provide $50 million in 
funding to the most crucial aspect of the Amended Plan, parking garages, 
came at the expense of more than $3 million in “children play nice” grants to 
the COC and Hillwood, and over $90 million in increment syphoning to West 
Dallas.186  While in 2012 this may have been the most expedient way to spur 
new construction and assessment gains for the City and correct previous public 
realm shortcomings, the benefit for municipal coffers is a fraction of that to be 
seen by the very parties responsible for underperformance and through which 
an effective monopoly capture was created.  However for the OED, the  
ultimate success of a flagship incentive project and execution of a typically 
once-in-a-metro area development opportunity (a major professional sports 
arena district),187 could sell its value in making Dallas a more complete and 
attractive destination in the competition for firms, talent, and tax base.188  
In the end though, the Amended Plan has been a success in its primary 
Victory Park objectives.  As of 2015, available garage spaces have released 
many of the remaining Hillwood surface lots for development.189  With a 
strong market for land in the vicinity, a complete, connected, and sustainably 
vibrant urban community is beginning to emerge twenty years after the major 
arena negotiations took place.  However, the success in neighborhoods  
immediately outside of the Hillwood-dominated TIF zone leaves the glaring 
question of whether a far more efficient and taxpayer-friendly result could 
have been achieved without the false barriers imposed by the PRAs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the twenty years since the Arena Master Agreement, the original SATD 
lands have gone from a contaminated brownfield to the home of one of the 
busiest sports arenas in North America and an estimated $1.6 billion in new 
construction.  Yet as a neighborhood, Victory Park is locally regarded as a 
bust and development has been uneven at best, especially when compared to 
certain nearby areas.190  While TIF has paid for substantial public  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186. DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 65, at 22, 31–33. 
187. See generally Samuel Nunn & Mark S. Rosentraub, Sports Wars: Suburbs and Center Cities 
in a Zero-Sum Game, 21 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 65 (1997). 
188. See Lefcoe, supra note 20, at 428–32. 
189. See DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 87, at 14. 
190. Wick Allison, The Failure of Victory Park, D MAGAZINE, June 2009, 
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improvements, the SATD has fallen victim to two common, and in this case 
overlapping, TIF criticisms.  First, there is little to indicate that prior to the 
2008 recession there was “but-for” present—instead, market conditions as  
opposed to TIF subsidy drove developer timelines.  Secondly, the issue of TIF 
transparency manifested itself through regulatory capture.  Here the developer 
parties were able to leverage bargaining power and overlapping interests with 
the local economic development agency to garner unnecessary subsidies that 
the broader polity had less individual interest in and capacity to challenge.  
Once the capture framework was established, the decisions available to the 
City were limited to making the best of a flawed existing structure.  Although 
TIF funds later became important in correcting mistakes and freeing surface 
lots to be built upon, this iteration of “but-for” was manufactured out of poor 
decisions driven by the developer parties at the project’s inception. 
This faux “but-for” and use of TIF as an instrument of developer capture 
was incubated by Texas’ highly-permissive TIF statute as well as the will of 
elected municipal leadership and the City’s agents to compete for firms and 
talent through the provision of the amenities and built forms that these targets 
were perceived as desiring, as noted in the literature.191  At the end of the day 
however, Dallas will broadly get what was originally envisioned, but on a 
longer and more painful timeline, and with a TIF subsidy that appears to have 
not been truly necessary beyond its role in removing artificially imposed  
parking restrictions.  
For other cities considering similar projects, the Dallas SATD experience 
demonstrates how TIF can be a relatively low-risk throw-in if a subsidy  
package requires bolstering to complete a facility deal insofar as the subsidy 
(in a pay-as-you-go TIF) will only materialize proportionate to new  
development.  However, for both cities and citizens, the Dallas case also  
underlines the importance of initial deal frameworks.  The SATD serves as a 
warning that unintended consequences (in Dallas, the PRAs) and sub-optimal 
bargaining positions can result in the capture of public agents and the  
provision of unnecessary subsidies to private parties.  More specifically, if the 
facility project is premised on the promise of ancillary real estate  
development, a legal commitment to that end with penalty clauses for  
non-compliance places the public jurisdiction in a stronger position relative to 
an instance, like Dallas, where there was no such obligation.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2009/june/the-failure-of-victory-park/; see 
Schnurman, supra note 1; see also DALL. OFF. ECON. DEV., supra note 133, at 7. 
191. See Lefcoe, supra note 20, at 428–32. 
